Temporary foreign worker programs are typically seen as short-term solutions to shortages of regional or occupational labor. During the past decade, Canadian regions experienced unequal economic growth and some suffered from significant excess labor demand. The Canadian temporary foreign worker program was thus expanded and conditions to access it made easier. During the same period, wide regional discrepancies in unemployment rates persisted. This paper shows that some of the persistence is due to the increased availability of temporary foreign workers. This suggests that policy makers did not price them correctly to avoid adverse effects on the Canadian labor market.
Many OECD countries have tailored TFW programs to target highly skilled individuals in general (i.e., managers, university trained professionals) or skilled occupations (i.e., IT or health workers) but in the past decade, there has been a rise in programs for lower-skilled workers, and Canada is no exception (OECD 2006a, Part 1.C.1.). The Canadian program was designed to attract skilled workers and over time, a seasonal component (i.e. the farm worker program) and an occupation-specific component (the live-in-caregiver program) were introduced. In 2002, the program was extended to cover low-skill workers. While hiring conditions are specified to avoid adverse effects on the labor market, the present paper essentially concludes that these conditions are not sufficient.
There are several reasons why investigating whether the TFW program adversely affects the labor market is an important question. Canadian regions have long exhibited large differences in their labor market performances which have persisted until today despite the particularly strong economic growth since the mid-1990s. In addition, these differences vary greatly across skill levels. While high-skill workers face very similar unemployment rates across the country, lowskill workers face both large disparities in unemployment rates across provinces and much higher unemployment than their high-skill counterparts. Hence, there appears to be little regional convergence in unemployment except for the most skilled. During the same period, the Canadian TFW program underwent major changes, most of which have contributed to making it easier for employers to hire temporary foreign workers. An extension to low-skill workers and a relaxation of hiring conditions are the two most striking features recently introduced. By finding that the recent extension of the TFW program to low-skilled individuals has indeed had detrimental effects on the spatial adjustments of labor markets in Canada and has thus contributed to wider discrepancies in provincial unemployment rates, we suggest that these recent changes may not have been warranted given the country-wide state of the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Canadian TFW program including evidence about its growth in recent years. Section 3 discusses regional unemployment disparities and surveys the main reasons for such disparities. Section 4 presents the model of regional adjustment, which serves as basis for the empirical investigation of Section 5.
Section 6 provides conclusions.
Temporary Foreign Workers in Canada
The Canadian TFW program is made of several sub-programs and each has its own specificities and thus deserves a separate analysis. In this paper we consider only the skilled and unskilled temporary foreign workers who get authorization from the border authorities to enter Canada and for whom there is a labor market test. The programs covered are thus, the skilled and unskilled temporary foreign worker program, the live-in-caregiver program, and the seasonal agricultural worker program. 1 These programs while marginally different are typical in the sense that they share a number of characteristics with past and present programs: Foreign workers must pre-arrange a fixed-term employment contract; workers cannot change employers during the contract; workers are not entitled to automatic family reunion; upon expiry of the permit, workers must leave the country for a defined period of time. What distinguishes programs across time and countries are entry regulations. In Canada there is no quota, but employers must pay a small administration fee ($150) and the number of entries is determined by employers' demand subject to a labor market test.
after twelve months. Also, applications could now be filed electronically and the required period of job advertising by the employer was shortened from about two to three weeks to one week (OECD 2008, Table II.A1.2) . Also, provincial lists of Occupations under Pressure were established for which the process was accelerated further.
It is clear from this brief description that the Canadian TFW program has undergone broad changes to alleviate perceived labor shortages. This has been achieved by easing firms' access to foreign workers and decreasing their hiring cost; as a result, entries of temporary foreign workers have grown dramatically. As Figure 1 shows, annual entries of temporary foreign workers grew from about 101,000 at the beginning of the latest economic expansion in 1993 to 165,200 in 2007 (+63.6%). There is also a clear negative correlation between entries of TFW and unemployment rates during the period as unemployment declined from about 11.4% to 6% 4 between 1993 and 2007 as expected by the rules governing the TFW program. Moreover, since before the policy change in 2001, the proportion of unskilled TFW has increased from 27.3% to 44.1% in 2007 while the previous historical high occurred in 1990 with 39.1%. 5 When temporary seasonal agricultural workers are excluded the progression is from 10.8% to 26.6% with a historical high at 25.7% in 1990 ( Figure 2 ).
This growth took place while Canada, a permanent settlement country, was accepting around 250,000 immigrants per year. One of the reasons advanced for having a temporary foreign 4 It is worth noting that in the 1970s and 1980s when Switzerland had a similar programme, the overall unemployment rate in that country was less than 2 % (Gross, 2006) . New Zealand experienced a sharp increase in temporary foreign workers after unemployment fell below 4 % in 2004 4 % in (OECD, 2007 . 5 The high share of low skill in 1990 is due to women for whom the share was 61.2% while it was 26.6% for men. By 1996, the shares for the two groups were quite similar (i.e., 26% for women and 24.5% for men) and there had been a drastic fall in entries of unskilled women. To our knowledge there is no study on the skill and gender composition of TFW in the 1980s and 1990s as the total number of TFW entries was not a concern at the time. Some of the decline in female TFW could be due to the introduction of the Live-in-Caregiver program in 1992 which imposed higher training and education requirements than the program previously in place (Kalaw and Gross, 2010) . Another possibility is the change in policy for exotic dancers in several provinces after fast growth in the industry in the early 1990s and a surge in entries of foreign dancers. Unfortunately CIC does not provide data for TFW entries per occupations.
worker program is that processing permanent immigration takes too long and skills cannot be targeted for the present needs of the market. Broadly speaking unskilled permanent resident enter Canada mostly under the family class as the economic class targets skilled permanent immigrants with a point system (see DeVoretz, 2006 , for details) and many may plan on entering the labor market upon arrival. Since both permanent and temporary immigrants feed the demand for labor, the correlation between the two groups matter to identify the responsibility of TFW in The next task is to show that large divergences among provincial unemployment rates persisted during the expansion of the TFW program.
Regional Unemployment in Canada

Statistical Evidence
In an integrated economy, labor market disparities are more likely to arise under regional aggregate demand shocks than national shocks in part because of regional specialization in economic activity (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998; Decressin and Fatas, 1995) . Evidence that, in Canada, regional shocks have become relatively more prominent over time come from the results of the estimation of the impact of national employment growth on provincial employment growth (see Table A .I.1. in Appendix I for detailed results). The adjusted R 2 varies between 0.066 for BC and 0.920 for Ontario and are low for non-manufacturing and small provinces (BC, Saskatchewan, 6 At the skill level, the correlations between 1997 and 2007 are 0.248 for A; -0.364 for B; .423 for C, and -0.495 for D. Unfortunately, the NOCS classification is available only since 1997. Also, permanent immigrants' skill levels are recorded based on "intention to work" which does not guarantee that the person will actually look for work. In 2007, 129,426 permanent immigrants indicated they intended to work out of 247,243 and 68,033 provided an intended occupation (CIC, 2009 ).
New Brunswick, PEI and Newfoundland); for a majority of provinces, the elasticity of provincial employment growth with respect to national employment growth is significantly different from one. This is consistent with the general view that in recent years, energy-rich provinces have led Canada's economic growth rather than manufacturing-intensive provinces and it also suggests increasing pressures for internal reallocation of labor; yet there is evidence of increased persistence in labor market disparities.
Persistence in provincial disparities has been observed in the Canadian literature for decades (see for example, Lazar, 1977) , but Table 1 provides evidence of increased persistence in provincial unemployment divergence between the last two periods of expansion (defined as steady decline in overall unemployment). It shows that the simple correlation among provincial unemployment rates between the beginning and end of both periods (i.e., 1983 and 1989; 1993 and 2007) Between 1983 and 1989 no adjacent provinces exchanged spots and the first 9 ranks were switched around. Hence, the later period exhibits more persistence than the earlier one.
This inertia, moreover, appears to be driven by low-skill unemployment rates (see Table   2 ). While only two provinces kept the same ranking for university-educated people, five/four provinces did not change rank for the low-skill categories C/D; moreover, all provinces except Further evidence of the slow adjustment in provincial unemployment rates is given in Table   3 , where unit root tests are conducted over the longest available sample with quarterly observations (1976.1-2010.4 In summary, evidence point toward increased persistence in divergences for provincial unemployment rates during the past decades driven by lower-skill categories while there was an expansion of the use of low-skilled TFW.
Links to the Literature
The neo-classical model of labor market adjustment suggests that regional divergences are not sustainable. Imbalances trigger relative wage changes, which generate changes in labor force participation as well as encourage employers to adjust their input mix or to relocate. Persistent discrepancies then exist because of long-run differences in equilibrium unemployment rates or slow operation of the equilibrium mechanism. Specifically, if temporary worker programs are not constrained or priced adequately, employers and individuals might be discouraged from considering alternatives (Ruhs, 2002) .
Theoretically, observed persistence in unemployment divergences can come from two sources: Differences in equilibrium unemployment and sluggish adjustment toward the equilibrium. 8 Countries' differences in equilibrium unemployment are commonly attributed to differences in labor market institutions, such as social programs and wage-setting mechanisms. In Canada, province-specific public policies have been shown to contribute to persistent dispersion in unemployment. Johnson and Kneebone (1991) for instance estimate that the natural rate of unemployment in 1980 was highest in Newfoundland at 14.8% and lowest in Alberta at 4%. They attribute these discrepancies to different structural factors such as unemployment insurance generosity and relative minimum wage rates as well as to different responses to these structural factors. In 1996, the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program was substantially reformed and renamed Employment Insurance (EI); it still encompasses strong regional-specific aspects that allow unemployed workers to qualify faster and collect benefits for a longer period in higher unemployment regions. 9 These features are likely to have perpetuated regional unemployment differences in recent times.
With shocks becoming more "regional" since the start of the growth period in 1993, it is expected that adjustments in the supply of labor occurred through internal migration and labor force participation adjustments. Table 4 provides inter-provincial flows for fourteen years before and after the peak of unemployment in 1993. Generally, internal migration flows decreased over time despite shocks being more region-specific. All provinces except Alberta experienced a decrease in in-migration, and all but Newfoundland and BC experienced a decrease in outmigration.
Past and recent literature on Canada, even though relatively scarce, confirms the weakening of the response of internal migration to regional labor market states. Grenier (2008) argues that the mobility of the working age population across Canada has decreased between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, a result also found by Cousineau and Vaillancourt (2001) . Coulombe (2006) shows that inter-provincial migration do not respond to regional shocks but respond to more fundamental changes such as rural/urban structure or long-term differences in unemployment. The early literature from the 1980s shows that the lack of mobility between Canadian regions is mainly due to government policies and unemployment insurance in particular (for examples, Shaw, 1986; Polese, 1981) , a point reaffirmed in Day and Winer (2001) , who expand the study to income taxes and provincial per capita spending. Cousineau and Vaillancourt (2001) point toward an aging population and a more equal distribution of income due in part to transfer programs. Finally, one of the consequences of low inter-provincial migration is wage inequality; hence, among factors affecting wage inequality, one should find those affecting migration. Dickie and Gerking (1998) find that in addition to transfer payment, relocation costs (age, low education, and language) are strongly related to wage differentials. 10 In an earlier study concerning Atlantic Canada, Drewes (1987) argues that persistently high unemployment in the region was due to inappropriately high wages imported from other Canadian regions.
In conclusion, there is ample evidence that large persistent disparities exist across provincial labor markets in Canada. Several studies confirm that such persistence reflects different equilibriums due to social programs' incentives. The presence of large regional shocks, however, is expected to trigger some migration flows, which, according to the evidence, did not occur. There is compelling evidence that divergence of provincial labor markets increased recently while internal mobility has decreased. This coincides with the temporary foreign worker program being expanded in regions under large positive demand shocks. Hence, it is natural to investigate whether the expansion of the TFW program contributed to slowing further inter-regional adjustments in Canada.
Theory
To investigate the possible role of temporary foreign worker programs on the persistence in regional unemployment divergence, we adapt Blanchard and Katz (1992) 's model of the labor market. The model is composed of four equations: a short-run demand for labor, a wage-setting relation, a labor supply and a long-run regional labor demand. 11 Given that, in equilibrium, the demand for labor in a province is equal to employment in that province (and thus domestic labor force plus the stock of temporary workers minus the number of unemployed individuals), the four equations are:
In these equations, the variables are measured relatively to their national values. Equation (1) represents the short-run demand for labor where wage at time t in province j depends negatively (i.e., a>0) on employment in that province, (S j,t +TF j,t -u j,t ), and on the position of the demand, z j,t , for given employment level.
12 Equation (2) captures the relationship between unemployment and wage. It is assumed that higher unemployment is associated with lower wage (b>0). Also the more sensitive wage becomes with respect to change in unemployment (i.e., the higher b is), the more flexible the labor market of province j is. The variable
X , includes all factors other than unemployment that may affect the regional wage (such as unemployment benefits). In (3), the increase in the relative labor supply, whether through relative natural growth of the population, permanent immigration, relative increase in participation or relative internal migration captured by 11 Here we ignore stochastic shocks that may affect the demand and supply of labour. 12 If S measures the logarithm of the labor force and u is the unemployment rate then the logarithm of employment is approximately given by S-u (see Blanchard and Katz, 1992) .
S t j
X , , also comes from a high relative wage or a low relative unemployment rate. It is fair to say that the natural growth of population, except through permanent immigration, is not likely to play a large role compared to internal migrations or change in participation rates as the labor supply is relative to the national average. Thus in S t j X , , the main variables are the ones affecting internal migration, whether it is the mild weather and the West-coast lifestyle of BC, the metropolitan lifestyle of Toronto, the French culture of Quebec, or changes in permanent immigration laws. The last equation (4) X , contains the non-wage factors making a province attractive, such as relative technological progress that affect the goods produced in province j and thus the relative demand for labor, as well as amenities in province j other than wage, such as infrastructure, local taxes, regulatory and labor relations environment or even natural resources-in short, everything that affects the location decision of firms in province j relative to other provinces.
The long-term solution of the above model (u j,t =u j,t+1 ) for the unemployment rate is then ( )
Since the change in the number of temporary workers is not exogenous, we add an equation determining this change. Following the conditions for the LMO process, we assume that such a change does not depend on wage but negatively on the level of unemployment and on other factors such as the additional cost of hiring TFW: (5) and (6) are useful because they show that the flow of temporary workers has a direct impact on relative unemployment and could be estimated jointly.
Of course, the long-term reduced form for the unemployment rate (combining (5) and (6)
Now the long-term unemployment rate depends only on exogenous variables, and thus on T t j X , which includes the hiring cost of temporary workers (the lower this cost, the higher T t j X , ).
Estimations and results
The estimation is for a semi-log linear form of the unemployment reduced form (7), such that: (Coulombe, 2006) as well as permanent international migration. In effect, social and ethnic networks have been shown to affect immigrants' location choice (McDonald, 2003; Gross and Schmitt, 2003) . In Canada, immigrants concentrate in the three main urban centers (Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver) 14 and they tend to leave regions with few immigrants (Grenier, 2008) . A decrease in the birth rate and, an increase in urbanization have an adverse effect on unemployment.
A third supply shock variable is the share of non-economic immigrants in the annual inflow of permanent immigrants (NonEconSh t ). Recent changes in the permanent immigration legislation affected the skill composition of the international migrant labor force. In 1995, the Government of Canada wanting to refocus the policy on skilled immigrants introduced a target of 50% for permanent entries under the economic class. The subsequent decrease in the proportion of noneconomic permanent immigrants may have increased the need for low-skill TFW and thus, affect unemployment dispersion adversely.
Demand shocks, D t j X , , are represented by provincial specific demand shocks (Busc j,t ) and the log of real oil price (Loilp t ). Because of Canada's diversified industrial structure, persistent differences can be caused by variations in the energy price. The effect is made province-specific using provincial dummies (D j (Chui et al., 2009). measures are tested: the provincial length of qualifying and collection periods in deviation from national average (EIqual j,t , EIcoll j,t ) and a distance weighted dispersion of collection periods (EIben j,t ) which allows to capture cross-province deviations. An increase in the qualifying period is expected to decrease dispersion in unemployment while an increase in collection period has the opposite effect. The weighted measure is also tested because a longer distance may decrease incentive to move despite de fact that the collection period may be lower at home. Other provincespecific institutions likely to affect wage determination that are also taken into account are unionization rates (Union j,t ) and minimum wages (Lminw j,t ). Finally, the temporary foreign worker policy parameter, expected that an increases in the relative cost of hiring temporary foreign workers decreases regional unemployment as employers find it more advantageous to look beyond the local market.
Other additional hiring costs for TFW that are province-specific, such as health premiums during the waiting period, are accounted for by the fixed effect.
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To summarize, the basic empirical specification is: In Table 5 , columns 1 and 2, the validity of province-specific fixed effects is confirmed by the strongly significant Hausman test. This suggests that province-specific amenities that are time invariant such as West-coast lifestyle or cultural differences do matter. 16 In column 2, the significant coefficients have the expected sign. Generally the results show that a rise in relative provincial aggregate demand decreases unemployment and increasing the EI qualifying period decreases unemployment dispersion. Also, since the introduction of the pilot project for low-skill TFW in 2002, higher costs of hiring foreign workers decreased divergences in unemployment 16 It is important to note that variables with little time variations such as Urban j,t lose significance in the FE estimation.
rates. Before discussing the results further, we evaluate the validity of the results by correcting for some of the possible shortcomings of FE estimations.
Statistical Robustness
Cross-panel correlation may exist since the observations are for regions within a given country possibly subjected to common shocks. White cross-section standard errors (column 3)
weaken some levels of significance like the one for urbanization rate for example but overall the results remain unchanged.
One of the conditions needed in order for the results to be consistent and in line with the equilibrium reduced-form is strict exogeneity of explanatory variables; that is, future Xs and the unobserved heterogeneity term are not correlated with the error term in any period (i.e., E(ε j,t |x j,1 ,x j,2 , … x j,n ,c j )=0, t=1, ….n; Wooldridge, 2002 Wooldridge, , 2007 . The most likely candidate for endogeneity is the birth rate variable. Many studies have treated fertility as endogenous to women labor force participation and instruments used in macro studies are fertility-related policy variables (see for examples, Klerman, 1999; Bailey, 2006) . It is also possible that unemployment influences future birth rates. Following Wooldridge (2007), we introduce Birthr j,t+1 as additional explanatory variable to test for strict exogeneity (Table 5 , column 4), and it is not significant indicating strict exogeneity is not violated. Another source of correlation with c j is time-varying province-specific effects which are not taken into account (i.e., the fixed effect captures only mean effects). So, we introduce a time trend for each cross-section which is, however, likely to reduce efficiency. In column 5, the time trend is marginally significant and overall, the results remain quite stable. The coefficient of the share of permanent immigrants not coming through the economic class however, collapses in size and significance, possibly a result of co-linearity with the time trend (simple correlation -0.736) as the policy was to decrease that share over time. In fact it decreased relatively steadily from 62.8% in 1991 to 37.9% in 2001 and then evolved between 40% and 45% until 2007.
Considering the time dimension is relatively long (ten years), another concern is serial correlation within panels, especially since persistence in deviations has been identified. An AR (2) specification for the estimated error from the specification in column 3 shows that within panel serial correlation is unlikely. 17 Another issue to consider is non-stationarity which may lead to spurious correlation. Unit-root tests on the dependent variable do clearly reject the presence of a unit-root; however, those tests imply conditions that are not consistent with our model in addition to the time dimension being too short to produce reliable results. 18 Furthermore, the results obtained for the estimation in first difference in Table 5 , column 7, are very similar to those of the basic model in terms of significance of the main variables and travel cost in particular.
Following all these results, we conclude that the bias in the FE estimation is not too large and efficiency is adequately corrected for in the basic model.
Results
The next step is to test for robustness to changes in variables and measurements. In Table   6 , column 1 and 2, the collection period and the distance weighted collection period are used instead of the qualification period for the EI program. Both are significant with the expected sign.
There is little difference between the three alternatives but the specification with the non-weighted collection period (Table 5 , column 3) performs slightly better in terms of overall explanatory 17 The results are: e j,t =-0.005+0.098 e j,t-1 +0.069e j,t-2 with p-value=0.23 and 0.37 respectively for the coefficients on the lagged estimated errors. 18 The value for the Levin, Lin and Chu test is -1.182 with p-value equal to 0.119, and that of the Im, Pesaran and Shin test is -0.638 with p-value equal to 0.26. However, the former imposes the constraint of identical unit-root across panels with the economic implication of identical convergence rate across provinces (Maddala, 1990 , cited by Baltagi et al., 2007) . The latter requires cross-sectional independence which is inconsistent with our economic model.
power. In columns 3, a non-linear impact of EI qualifying parameters is weak but significant, suggesting that an increase in the number of weeks necessary to qualify has larger impact where it is already harder to qualify. The design of employment insurance based on regional unemployment rate may appear to lead to endogeneity of the EI parameters. However, unemployment data is available with a lag and according to the EI Act, the policy is based on a moving average of past rates. Both features are likely to lower the probability of endogeneity which is reflected by the results of exogeneity tests which show that the hypothesis cannot be rejected for EIqual j,t but is strongly rejected for EIcoll j,t . 19 In Table 5 , column 6, we estimate the basic model by Two-Stage Least Squares and the results are quite stable especially for our variable of interest, the cost of travel, despite the loss of one period. This is in part attributable to the fact that EIqual j,t is constant over numbers of years in most provinces. So, considering that the evidence of endogeneity is not compelling, we continue experimenting with our basic specification, maintaining the largest possible sample.
Next we test for two more provincial institutions relevant to labor market flexibility, i.e., unionization (column 4) and minimum wage (column 5). Neither is significant. In column 6, the housing price is substituted for urbanization rate as the exogenous factor that affects internal migration. Like relative urbanization, it is not significant. Finally, in column 7, the number of weeks of parental leave is used as a substitute for birth rates to represent exogenous shocks on labor force participation. The number of weeks is set by federal legislation and only one change which has fallen at the beginning of the 21 st century but also the cost relative to Canadian workers.
In columns 10, there is a negative impact before 2002 which has been aggravated since then. It is a bit surprising that the travel cost would be strongly significant before 2002 as it applied only to a small portion of TFW. This may be due to some multicollinearity as the relative foreign to domestic travel cost is correlated with the share of non-economic permanent immigrants (-0.796) the coefficient of which loses significance and magnitude. To summarize, the results from the alternative costs of hiring a TFW are generally consistent and the expansion of the program to lowskill workers has had an adverse impact on the Canadian labor market.
Finally, we also estimate by instrumental variable fixed effect (IVFE) a semi-reduced form model (i.e., equations (5) and (6) in Section 4) with TFW entries as explanatory variable to validate that the link between travel cost and unemployment dispersion is attributable to TFW.
Two measures are considered: Total entries per province relative to national (Ltfw j,t ) and total nonseasonal entries per province relative to national (Lnatfw j,t ). The results in Table 7 show that for both variables, the effect is positive and significant at 10% and 5% respectively and thus, more TFW entries increase regional unemployment dispersion.
General regional aggregate demand variations have the expected impact on the long-term unemployment divergences. Energy shocks increase unemployment in central Canada and the Maritimes and decrease it Western Canada and Newfoundland. As found in other studies, the EI parameters are strong contributors to maintaining unemployment dispersion. Each additional week of qualification period on average decreases provincial unemployment deviation by slightly less Eastern Canada. As it can be seen in Table 6 , columns 10 and 11 there is little difference in the results and thus we use 10,000 miles for further comments. However, in most other countries the program is limited to specific sectors (mostly agriculture) and/or there is an annual quota (OECD, 2008, Tables II.A.1.1. and II.A.1.2.) . The expansion to all low-skill occupations without limit in Canada has had an adverse effect on the Canadian labor market which suggests that such programs need to be carefully targeted.
Some countries have chosen a more market-oriented approach using complex mechanisms to price the hiring of unskilled TFW more accurately. Singapore, for example, imposes a monthly levy on employers hiring TFW which is industry-specific, skill-specific and rises with the employers' dependency level on temporary foreign workers. 22 The minimum fee for unskilled workers in manufacturing and services is S$240. In 2008, laborers earned S$975 monthly; hence the fee raised a worker's monthly wage by about 25% (Singapore Government, 2009a Government, , 2009b (i.e., employment abuse, irregular stay at the end of the contract, etc.; see for example Ruhs, 2002) are well documented. Hence, a higher premium to hire TFW may incite employers to offer better financial conditions to workers residing in other Canadian provinces and save some well known long-term costs linked to the temporary status of foreign workers.
Conclusion
Temporary foreign worker programs contribute to smooth economic growth. They are designed to alleviate short-term specific labor shortages by allowing a rapid and flexible response. 22 The levy is only one component of a very complex immigration policy rules (see for example, Yeoh, 2010) . 23 The computation is made for 50 weeks of 40 hours work over two years. Low-skill TFW are likely to work longer hours than that and the estimates represent upper bounds.
They are thus generally viewed as a policy which alleviates bottlenecks and thus avoids holding back short-term economic growth. In particular, because of skill complementarities that often exist among workers in a given sector, these programs often help domestic workers keep their jobs.
However they are usually not expected to have long-term adverse effects. Yet, this paper shows that the 2002 change in the Canadian temporary foreign labor program has likely contributed to affect adversely regional unemployment dispersions since both the reduced-and the semi-reduced form estimations confirm there is a causality link between the two. Canada, despite fifteen years of steady growth, still exhibits large persistent differences in provincial unemployment, and these have been reinforced recently by regional demand shocks. Some province-specific institutions, such as the employment insurance scheme, have contributed significantly to these differences.
However, this paper shows that the inter-provincial adjustment mechanism has also been slowed down by the expansion of the temporary foreign worker program to all low-skill occupations in 2002. While this expansion was accompanied by a labor market test, the pricing of low-skill TFW has been set too low to encourage employers to seek workers from high-unemployment provinces before seeking authorization to hire temporary foreign workers. In addition to maintaining unemployment at a higher level in some provinces, this may lead to future costs linked to the well known risks attached to TFW programs. However, this paper is the first attempt to evaluate the impact of relaxing the targeting of a temporary foreign worker program, and it is clear that further studies are needed especially to better evaluate the magnitude of the impact and the longer term dynamics for TFW. Sum of the weighted minimum number of weeks necessary to qualify for the benefits from any capital city. Weights are the inverse of the distance between the provinces' capital cities (Dist i,j , K&F). Calculated for each province j, and i≠j, as:
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